Course Description
Introduces students to the mathematics of social choice theory and its application to elections. Topics include problems with preference aggregation, Arrow's impossibility theorem, Sen's liberal paradox, and the paradox of apportionment. The course helps students understand the pragmatic and philosophical issues related to democratic decision-making and elections.
Athena Title
Social Choice and Elections
Equivalent Courses
Not open to students with credit in POLS 4071
Non-Traditional Format
This course will be taught 95% or more online.
Prerequisite
POLS 1101 or POLS 1101E or POLS 1101H or POLS 1101S
Semester Course Offered
Not offered on a regular basis.
Grading System
A - F (Traditional)
Student Learning Outcomes
- Students will learn analytical theories of political science that are applied to social choice and elections, including mathematical and deductive models that enhance logic skills.
- Students who develop the skills taught in this course should more clearly draw conclusions from stated premises and have a better understanding of the role of theory and logic in research.
- The skills taught in this course will lead students to think more analytically and constructively about politics.
- Students will become familiar with deductive proofs and learn the consequences of various electoral and institutional designs.
Topical Outline
- The paradox of apportionment
- Electoral systems in a variety of contexts
- Individual rationality
- Elections with two alternatives
- The Downsian model of mass elections
- Elections with three or more alternatives
- The problem of preference aggregation
- Condorcet’s paradox
- Arrow’s impossibility theorem
- Probabilistic social choice
- Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Formal conceptions of liberty
- Sen’s liberal paradox
